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1Abstract
This article provides evidence about the interrelationships between wages
and prices at the microeconomic level. We rely on the right-to-manage
model to specify and estimate a multivariate model explaining the timing
and magnitude of wage and price changes at the ﬁrm level. The data we
use is a quarterly panel of about 1800 ﬁrms from the French manufacturing
industry, observed over the years 1998 to 2005. We ﬁnd the occurrence of
wage changes to be essentially time dependent, though weakly related to
the state of the economy. However, the magnitude of wage changes strongly
depends on macroeconomic variables, namely inﬂation and unemployment,
and to a lesser extent on the evolution of the ﬁrm product price and on its
productivity gains. Changes in the ﬁrm product price are mostly driven by
the evolution of its costs and more speciﬁcally by that of its intermediate
input. The wage cost, as well as the production and the industry level inﬂa-
tion, have a weaker inﬂuence.
Keywords: wages, price stickiness, dynamic model, factor loadings
JEL Classiﬁcation E31, C23, C25
Résumé
Résumé: Cet article documente lŠinterdépendance des variations des salaires
et des prix au niveau microéconomique. Nous spéciﬁons et estimons un
modèle multivarié, inspiré du modèle du droit à gérer, pour expliquer lŠoc-
currence et lŠimportance des changements de salaires au niveau de lŠen-
treprise. Les changements de prix sont supposés pour leur part être déter-
minés selon un modèle state-dependent. Nos données sont constituées dŠun
panel trimestriel dŠenviron 1800 entreprises de lŠindustrie manufacturière,
observées de 1998 à 2005. Nous trouvons que lŠoccurrence des changements
de salaires dépend essentiellement dŠeﬀets saisonniers, et dans une moindre
mesure du contexte économique. Cependant, lŠimportance des variations
de salaires dépend fortement des variables macroéconomiques que sont lŠin-
ﬂation et le chômage, et dans une moindre mesure de lŠévolution du prix
de production de lŠentreprise ainsi que de ses gains de productivité. Les
variations du prix de production de lŠentreprise résultent essentiellement de
variations de ses coûts de production et plus précisément des coûts des con-
sommations intermédiaires. Le coût salarial, de même que la production et
lŠinﬂation sectorielle, exercent en comparaison une inﬂuence plus faible.
Mots clés: salaires, rigidité des prix, modèle dynamique, facteurs
Classiﬁcation JEL: E31, C23, C25
21 Introduction
At the macroeconomic level, myriads of papers have shown that wages and
prices strongly depend on each other. Wage variations depend on both ex-
pected and past inﬂation, and wages or more generally labor costs variations
appear to be a major driver of price inﬂation. At the ﬁrm level however, the
growing but still limited evidence on the link between wages and prices tends
to show that the relationships are much weaker. According to several sur-
veys recently conducted in the Euro area, about 60% of ﬁrms declare there
is no link between the decision to change their prices and that of changing
their wages. Only 15% of ﬁrms declare a strong link between these changes
(see Druant et al., 2009). Gaiotti (2008), Fougère et al. (2008), Loupias and
Sevestre (2010) and Harris and Sevestre (2009) provide simple statistics and
econometric evidence on the limited impact of wage variations on producer
price changes.
Explanations of this discrepancy between the micro and the macro ev-
idence are numerous. First, while at the microeconomic level, only the di-
rect eﬀect of changes in the ﬁrm labor cost onto its prices is assessed, the
macroeconomic impact of wage changes on prices incorporates both direct
and indirect eﬀects. Indeed, wage inﬂation in upstream ﬁrms induces an
inﬂation in intermediate input prices of downstream ﬁrms and consequently,
also contributes to their own product price inﬂation. Accordingly, the share
of labor costs in total production cost at the ﬁrm level is much lower than
its share in the value-added at the macro level. While wages represent about
60% of the GDP in France, the share of labor costs in French manufacturing
ﬁrms is about 20% (SESSI, 2005). Another rationale for the reduced im-
pact of wage changes on prices at the ﬁrm level may be found in the quite
small magnitude of wage changes as compared to that of other input price
changes. According to Heckel et al. (2008), the average wage change in
the French manufacturing industry was slightly above 2.2% over the period
considered while the average change of intermediate goods prices was about
4% (Gautier, 2008). Overall, the typical impact of wage increases on ﬁrms
production cost then appears to be of a limited magnitude. A further ar-
gument explaining this limited impact of wage changes on prices may be
found in the evolution of labor productivity, stemming from the technologi-
cal change and/or from possible adjustments in the quantity or composition
of the labor force. An increase in labor productivity clearly lowers the need
for ﬁrms to incorporate wage increases in prices, as long as this productivity
increase is only partially transmitted to wages (e.g. see Fuss, 2008). Indeed,
several studies have pointed to a limited sensibility of wages to productivity
changes (e.g. see Biscourp et al., 2005, Cardoso and Portela, 2009, Guiso et
al., 2005, and, more recently, Katay, 2008, and Fuss and Wintr, 2008). In
other words, it could be that ﬁrms partially oﬀset the consequences of wage
increases through the "capture" of a fraction of productivity gains they are
3able to generate.
The aim of this paper is to add one bit of evidence regarding the interre-
lationships between wage and price changes at the ﬁrm level. The framework
of our modelling is inspired from the right-to-manage model. Wages are bar-
gained between the ﬁrm and its employees and the ﬁrm then determines its
optimal level of employment and, in our case, that of its output price, by
maximizing its proﬁt. Moreover, because, at the ﬁrm level, neither wages nor
prices change each and every quarter, we explicitly model their respective
timings, allowing for a possible interdependence between these timings.
Our results point to essentially time dependent occurrences of wage
changes, notably driven by institutional rules, the importance of which, in
Europe, is underlined in Druant et al. (2009). Variables capturing the state
of the economy come to be at most of secondary importance. The magni-
tude of wage changes mostly depends on macroeconomic variables such as
inﬂation and unemployment. It is only to a lesser extent that ﬁrm level vari-
ables, such as producer price changes and productivity gains, inﬂuence wage
changes. As regards price changes, their main driver is the evolution of the
ﬁrm’s costs an more speciﬁcally the intermediate input costs. The wage cost
has a much weaker inﬂuence. The same conclusion holds for the production
and the industry level inﬂation, as in Loupias and Sevestre (2010).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description
of the institutional framework of wage setting in France, data sources as well
as some descriptive statistics about wage and price changes at the ﬁrm level.
The model is presented in Section 3 and estimation results are provided and
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Wage and price changes at the ﬁrm level : basic
features.
After a short presentation of the basic features of wage-setting in France, we
provide a description of the two main ﬁrm level data sources we use. First, the
ACEMO survey provides information about wages and employment at the
establishment-level. Second, the Banque de France business surveys provide
information on ﬁrms decisions regarding changes in their prices, among other
items. We then provide a brief characterization of the observed wage and
price changes.
2.1 Wage-setting in France
In France, wage-setting occurs within a decentralized institutional frame-
work. The 1982 Auroux Acts have made annual wage bargaining compulsory
at both the industry and ﬁrm levels. Industry-level agreements are binding
unless ﬁrm-level agreements exist and are more favourable to the ﬁrm em-
4ployees, which is often the case. Montornès and Sauner-Leroy (2009) indi-
cate that wages actually paid are higher than the negotiated sectoral wages
in nearly one half of ﬁrms. The diﬀerential is around 6% of the sectoral base
wage. The government is a third actor of the wage-setting process in France.
It intervenes indirectly, ﬁrst via sectoral agreement extension mechanisms to
ensure fair competition within industries, and second, via increases in the
minimum wage. Then, despite a low rate of trade union membership, the
coverage of wage agreements in France is virtually total. Indeed, employees
are covered by their ﬁrm and sector-level agreements even if they do not
belong to a union, and the sectoral agreement extension mechanisms further
apply. Montornès and Sauner-Leroy (2009) point that 98% of the enter-
prises are covered by an agreement in a given year, either at the company
or at the industry-level. The minimum wage applies to all workers and all
ﬁrms (between 10% and 15% of the workers are paid at the minimum wage).
Changes in the minimum wage are set according to oﬃcial rules, leading to
full indexation to past CPI inﬂation and to a partial indexation to the past
average wage growth of blue-collar workers. During the time period we con-
sider here, changes in the minimum wage occurred basically each year on the
ﬁrst of July. Because ﬁrms are encouraged to simultaneously increase wages
that are close to the minimum, wage changes appear to be rather frequent
in July, even for workers who earn more than the minimum wage. Moreover,
the collective bargaining timetable also impacts the timing of wage changes.
Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2010) show that wage agreements most often come into
eﬀect in January.
2.2 The ACEMO survey
The ACEMO survey is a longitudinal employer data set gathered by the
French Ministry of Labor and Social Aﬀairs. Data are collected through a
mandatory postal report sent to establishments with at least ten registered
employees. We only make use here of the data about establishments from the
French manufacturing industry, as deﬁned in the NES36 classiﬁcation. The
period covered starts in the fourth quarter of 1998 and ends in the fourth
quarter of 2005.
In this survey, the level of the base wage is collected for up to 12 rep-
resentative job positions in the establishment, depending on its size: small
establishments are asked about fewer positions than large ones. This set-up
allows the computation of the ﬁrm’ employees average wage1 as the average
wage, computed over the representative employees, weighted by the propor-
tion of workers they represent. In that respect, our study diﬀers from other
recent studies that focus on the wage of an employee belonging to the most
representative position (Druant et al., 2009) or of a random sample of the
1Because the very vast majority of establishments inquired in this survey are the only
establishment of the ﬁrm, we use indiﬀerently these two denominations here.
5employees (Christopoulou et al., 2010). Our measure also deviates from in-
dividual wages used in applications involving matched employer-employee
data. It should be understood as allowing the computation of a good ap-
proximation of the evolution of the ﬁrm’ wage costs. Indeed, this measure
is sensitive to changes in wages, as well as in the composition of the ﬁrm
employment. Wage decreases may correspond to wage cuts but also to less
skilled or less experienced new workers occupying the inquired job position;
and vice-versa for average wage increases. It must be reminded here that
the ﬁrm average wage cost is the relevant measure when studying wage-price
interrelationships at the ﬁrm level. Despite some components of the labor
cost, such as employer contributions and bonuses, are not recorded in this
survey, the growth rate of the base wage is indeed a relevant measure of the
evolution of the ﬁrm wage cost. First, employer contributions do not vary a
lot and changes are exogenous to the ﬁrm. We control for these in the re-
gressions using time dummies. Second, performance bonuses represent only
around 3% of the individual earnings, and overtime bonuses 1%. Clearly,
even if individual employees’ wages may be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by bonuses,
these do not aﬀect signiﬁcantly the evolution of the average wage of the ﬁrm.
Measurement errors nevertheless remain an important issue in the study
of wage dynamics (Gottschalk, 2005), typically leading to tiny and irrelevant
wage changes. Several checks are performed by the French Ministry of La-
bor and Social Aﬀairs during the data collecting process, especially when a
change larger than 2% is observed for a given position between two consec-
utive quarters. We further set to 0 all growth rates of the mean wage of a
magnitude less than 0.01%. In addition to these corrections, the measure-
ment error issue is further delt with in our econometric analysis by using
instrumental variables estimation methods.
2.3 The Banque de France business survey
The monthly Banque de France manufacturing industry business surveys pro-
vide ﬁrm-level records about ﬁrms’ product price changes as well as about
changes in their intermediate input prices, their production level, the orders
they receive, etc. The surveyed unit is a particular product, identiﬁed at
the 4-digit NACE level, produced in a particular plant. A given ﬁrm can be
surveyed several times during the same month if it is made of multiple es-
tablishments, or if it consists of a single multiproduct (large) establishment.
However, the very large majority of the ﬁrms in the sample are made of one
establishment only and are surveyed for only one product. About 4000 ﬁrms
are inquired every month. The information recorded in the survey is essen-
tially qualitative: each inquired variable may take on seven diﬀerent values,
starting from a strong decrease up to a strong increase through medium or
small decreases, the absence of change and small or medium increases. How-
ever, as explained below in more details, for all the variables involved in the
6price equation of our model, we have restricted our attention to three out-
comes: decrease, no change and increase (see Section 3.3 for more details).
The period covered by our dataset is January 1996-December 2005. Due
to the process of data cleaning and to the merging with the ACEMO survey,
our dataset ﬁnally contains information regarding about 1800 ﬁrms, observed
over the totality or a fraction of the period 1998:Q4 to 2005:Q4.
The other data we use in our subsequent econometric analysis comprise
the producer price indices (PPI) at the NACE2-digit level as well as macroe-
conomic data such as the consumer price index (CPI) and the unemployment
rate.2
2.4 Identifying wage and price spells
Because we do not only focus on the magnitude of price (resp. wage) changes
but also on their timing, we need to identify price (resp. wage) trajectories
and spells. Trajectories are deﬁned as sequences of price (resp. wage) con-
secutive records corresponding to a given product/ﬁrm. Spells correspond
to a sequence of price (resp. wage) consecutive records corresponding to an
unchanged price (resp. wage) level for the same product/ﬁrm, starting just
after the price (resp. wage) was changed and ending with the next price (resp.
wage) change. Two diﬃculties had to be tackled at this stage. First, missing
observations led us to deﬁne multiple trajectories for the same product/ﬁrm.
Indeed, when the monthly data are not available for the ﬁrst (resp. last)
month of any quarter, we consider the quarter as indicating the beginning
(resp. end) of a trajectory. Second, because the Banque de France business
survey is monthly while the ACEMO survey is quarterly, we had to decide
whether we would rely on monthly or quarterly series for merging the data.
We decided to aggregate the monthly data into quarterly series by comput-
ing quarterly averages.3 When the monthly data indicate several changes
within a quarter, we thus retain a single change equal to the quarterly aver-
age. This rule led to a speciﬁc diﬃculty regarding the beginning and end of
price trajectories and price spells. When price records were not available for
all months of a quarter corresponding to the start (resp. the end) of a spell
or trajectory, we averaged the data over the consecutive months for which
they were available. Along the same lines, because the Banque de France
business survey is not run in August, the averages for the third quarter were
computed over the months of July and September when they were both part
of the same spell.
Finally, because of the presence of state-dependent variables in our model,
we had to discard left-censored spells. Indeed, estimating such models re-
quires knowing the evolution of the determinants of price (resp. wage) since
the beginning of the price (resp. wage) spell.
2These data have been obtained from the INSEE website: www.insee.fr.
3See Loupias and Sevestre (2010) for an alternative methodology and its justiﬁcations.
72.5 Descriptive statistics
Once trajectories and spells were built for prices and wages, we merged the
two datasets and ended up with a sample comprising 15 635 observations,
corresponding to 1 778 ﬁrms and 1 906 plants/products. This sample con-
tains 7 054 price spells, of average duration 3.07 quarters, and 9 560 wage
spells of average duration 1.92 quarters.
The price spell average duration we obtain here is quite similar to that
obtained in previous studies about producer prices in France and in other
countries (see Avouyi-Dovi et al., 2010, Loupias and Sevestre, 2010, and
Vermeulen et al., 2007). The durations of the wage spells we computed from
the ACEMO survey are shorter than the intuition of conventional duration
of one year, as described in Heckel et al. (2008). The explanation is quite
simple: the measure we use here is the change in the average wage of workers
occupying the surveyed job positions within the establishment. This measure
is likely to change whenever the wage of the employee occupying any of the
surveyed positions changes, or because of staggered wage changes within a
ﬁrm.4 Such results should not be considered as altering the validity of our
wage measure, as it is meant to approximate changes in the ﬁrm mean labor
cost and in no way the individual workers’ wage changes.
Basic statistics about changes in wages and prices are presented in Figure
1 and Table 1. Not surprisingly, the absence of change is the mode for both
distributions and the mean wage growth rate density is strongly asymmetric:
49% of the observations are raises and 6% are decreases.
Figure 1: Descriptive statistics on the mean wage growth rate and price
changes
Source: Banque de France business survey merged with 


































Source: Banque de France business survey merged with 








The estimated mean wage density has its support between -2% and 5%,
4The survey contains information on whether a given a position has seen a staﬀ replace-
ment and Heckel et al. (2008) use this information to compute individual-speciﬁc wage
spells. Their wage spells corrected for turnover are on average of 2 quarters. The durations
of our wage spell are thus only very marginally aﬀected by the employees turnover.
8with a major mode in 0 and a minor one at 1%. Most of the increases are of
limited magnitude, as 49% of them are between 0 and 1%. A closer look at
the estimated distribution of non-null wage changes is obtained from Figure
2. It has modes at 0.15% and 1%, as well as humps at 0.5%, 1.5%, 2% and
3%.
Figure 2: Estimated density of non-zero wage changes



















Source: Banque de France business survey merged with 








On the other hand, the price distribution is pretty symmetric, with only
slightly more increases (19%) than decreases (16%). The estimated density
of price changes is symmetric with its mode at 0 : whereas the wage cost
has a clear tendency to increase, it is less so for prices. There is no evidence
here of a strong simultaneity of price and wage increases. Many oﬀ-diagonal
elements in Table 1 are signiﬁcantly positive.
Table 1: Price and wage joint variations
Price
Wage decrease constant increase Total
decrease 1 4 1 6
constant 7 30 8 45
increase 8 31 10 49
Total 16 65 19 100
Table 2 also shows how often the price of the ﬁnal product is changed
in conjunction with a change in either wages, intermediate input costs or
demand. As previously pointed out by Loupias and Sevestre (2010), the price
of the ﬁnal product seems to be more sensitive to the cost of intermediate
inputs than to wages. Only a third of wage variations translate to price
adjustments within a quarter while about one half of variations in the cost of
intermediate inputs induce producer price changes. Overall, these statistics
9do not point to a strong simultaneity between wage and price variations at
the ﬁrm level in the manufacturing industry.
Table 2: Change in producer price along with other changes
Variables Costs Demand
raw materials labor ﬁnal product
Price increase 49 36 36
Note: Proportions do not sum to one because we condition
on variations of a single variable.
3 Modeling wage and price decisions
This section aims at providing some theoretical underpinnings about how
producer prices and wages are determined at the ﬁrm level.
3.1 Explaining the magnitude of wage changes
Our approach to the modeling of wage changes at the ﬁrm level essentially
relies on the right-to-manage model. Indeed, we consider that wages are bar-
gained between ﬁrms and employees, and that ﬁrms determine their product
price and their employment level so as to maximize their proﬁt.
We follow the literature (see Nickell and Andrews, 1983, and, for a re-
cent empirical reference Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2010) and assume that
bargained wages can be seen as the outcome of the maximization of :
λlog([u(wit) − u(wa
it)]N) + (1 − λ)logπit, (1)
where u(wit) is a worker’s utility from wage wit, wa
it is the wage from an
outside option in case of a bargaining dispute, N is the employment, πit de-
notes proﬁts and λ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter increasing in the union bargaining
power. When workers have a strong bargaining power (λ close to 1), the
bargaining process essentially accounts for workers’ utility. On the contrary,
when workers have no bargaining power (λ close to 0), only the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
is considered. This formulation relies on the assumption that in the event
of unsuccessful bargaining, the ﬁrm makes no proﬁt (the outside option for
ﬁrms is πa
it = 0) while workers receive the alternative option wa
it. Maximizing

















10Wages in ﬁrm i evolve between t − 1 and t as the alternative option does
plus a fraction of the evolution of the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. The larger is the
workers’ bargaining power, the larger the fraction of proﬁts they obtain.
We consider here that the alternative wage can be represented as either the
average wage in the economy or the sectoral wage. Their evolutions are
supposed to depend primarily on past and expected CPI inﬂation and on
the level of unemployment.5 The evolution of wages in ﬁrm i also depends
on the evolution of its proﬁts, which in turn depends on the evolution of the
labor productivity but also on the expected, current and past evolution of its
product price, which may be considered by workers as an indication about
the evolution of the ﬁrm proﬁtability.
Our equation explaining the magnitude of wage changes (when they oc-
cur) is then written as :
∆wit =b0 + b1cpi_infl+1 + b2cpi_infl + b3cpi_infl−1 + b4cpi_infl−r
+ b5u + b6u−1 + b7u−2
+ b8∆Price+1 + b9∆Price + b10∆Price−1 + b11∆Price−r
+ b12∆Prod + b13∆Prod−1 + b14∆Prod−r (4)
The speciﬁcation involves :6
• the CPI inﬂation rate since the last wage change, decomposed into its
current value, cpi_infl, that of the previous quarter, cpi_infl−1,and
the remaining evolution since the start of the spell, cpi_infl−r. This
accounts for backward indexation of wages on prices. We also include
the expected inﬂation over the next year, cpi_infl+1, to check for
possible forward indexation.
• the current and past levels of the unemployment ratio, u, u−1 and u−2,
as the labor market situation is likely to have an impact on the value
of the workers’ outside options.
• the expected variation in the producer’s price, ∆Price+1, as well as its
evolution since the last wage change, also decomposed into its current
variation, ∆Price, that of the previous quarter, ∆Price−1, and the
remaining evolution since the start of the spell, ∆Price−r. As stated
above, in a bargaining environment, workers may claim for some proﬁt
sharing if they observe an increase in the ﬁrm’s prices which they can
consider as an indication of increased proﬁts. On the contrary, ﬁrms
facing strong negative shocks may manage to decrease their average
5We also experienced a speciﬁcation where wage variations depend on unemployment
variations. This however led to restrictions on the parameters that are not acceptable at
the usual conﬁdence levels.
6See Appendix B for a detailed description of the variables measurement.
11wage cost in order to accommodate a necessary decrease in their output
price.
• the evolution of the ﬁrm’s productivity since the last wage change,
again decomposed into its current variation, ∆Prod, that of the pre-
vious quarter, ∆Prod−1, and the remaining evolution since the start
of the spell, ∆Prod−r. As stated above, wages variations should be
related, at least partly, to the evolution of the ﬁrm’s productivity.
• industry and year dummies, to account for sectoral speciﬁcities and for
macroeconomic shocks.
However, as previously underlined, several studies (see Avouyi-Dovi et al.,
2010, as well as Horny et al., 2010, for France, or Druant et al., 2009, for
Europe) and our data show that ﬁrms do not negotiate nor change wages
each and every quarter. We thus need to add an equation in our model to
explain the timing of wage changes.
The structure of our model for explaining wage changes is then a Type 2
- Tobit model, deﬁned as follows. The timing of wage changes is determined
in the following way :
dit =
(
1 (a wage change occurs) if d∗
it > 0








it is a vector of covariates which is described in details just below.




it if dit = 1







it is a matrix containing the variables listed under equation (4)
above.
3.2 Explaining the timing of wage changes
As stated in Section 2.1, essential components of the timing of wage changes
are institutional. These include the timing of the negotiations, mandatory
once a year, as well as the timing of the conventional increases in the mini-
mum wage. In “normal times”, the timing of wage negotiations and the sub-
sequent wage changes are thus essentially time-dependent. However, state
dependence may also play a role: acceleration of CPI inﬂation, changes in
the ﬁrm’s own product prices and the occurrence of a persistent shock on
productivity may also lead workers to bargain over wages. The list Xd
it of
12covariates that we consider to explain the timing of wage changes then in-
cludes:
• duration dummies, to account for the regularity of wage changes. In
the above mentioned surveys, ﬁrms typically declare they would change
their employees’ wages once a year.
• quarter dummies, to allow for the peaks in the timing of wage changes.
Wage changes are more likely to occur during the ﬁrst and third quar-
ters.
• strong and persistent productivity shocks, i.e. strong decreases of the
plant’s productivity lasting at least 2 consecutive quarters. Indeed, in
a competitive environment, wages should be related to the evolution of
the ﬁrm’s productivity, even though ﬁrms do not seem to fully adjust
wages to productivity changes (e.g. see Biscourp et al., 2005, Guiso et
al., 2005, and, more recently, Katay, 2008, Fuss and Wintr, 2008, and
Cardoso and Portela, 2009). Strong variations in productivity (e.g.
due to strong variations in the ﬁrm’s output level) may nevertheless
be an incentive for ﬁrms or workers to bargain over wages, especially
when these variations are expected to be lasting.
• occurrences of expected, current and past changes in the ﬁrm product
prices. In an imperfect competition framework, ﬁrms able to raise
their prices may be in a position to accept more easily to share the
rent through wage increases. Conversely, those having to lower their
prices to achieve a better competitiveness may exert a pressure to make
their labor costs decrease.
• the possible change in CPI inﬂation (either past or expected); although
the period we consider here was essentially a period of quite stable
inﬂation, one should not rule out the possibility that changes in the
rhythm of inﬂation may lead workers to claim for new negotiations.
• industry and year dummies. These variables may capture speciﬁc in-
dustry level characteristics (such as the degree of unionization), as well
as macroeconomic evolutions inﬂuencing the timing of wage changes.
• plant size. The inclusion of this variable is a consequence of measuring
wage evolutions using the ACEMO survey: depending on their size, es-
tablishments are asked about wages corresponding to one up to twelve
representative positions. Changes of the average labor cost are thus
more likely to be observed in larger ﬁrms.
133.3 Price determination
We rely here on the literature on state-dependent price-setting behavior in
an imperfect competition context (see Cecchetti, 1986, and, more recently,
Fougère et al., 2008, Dhyne et al., 2007 and Rupprecht, 2007, among many
others) and more particularly on Loupias and Sevestre (2010). In this frame-
work, ﬁrms set their product price but face a menu cost when they change
their price. The occurrence of a price change then corresponds to a situa-
tion where the discrepancy between the optimal price P∗
it and the price that
would be eﬀective if no change is decided, that is the price at time t − 1,
Pit−1, exceeds the cost of a price change. An empirical concern is that the
optimal price P∗
it is not observable. To circumvent this problem, an approach
is to model the optimal price so as to express it as a function of observed
variables.7
Assume a static Cobb-Douglas cost function :






where Qit represents the ﬁrm production level, wit represents the wage cost,
iipit the price of intermediate inputs, and Ai(j)t represents unobserved vari-
ables aﬀecting costs.
The ﬁrm is selling its product on a market where monopolistic competi-
tion prevails. Under a constant price elasticity of demand, a (a < −1), proﬁt
















+ lnAi(j)t + (α − 1)lnQit + β lnwit + γ lniipit. (11)
The impact on input price changes on the output price is proportional to
their share in the cost. We thus expect a stronger impact of changes in
intermediate input prices than of wage changes. Indeed, the share of inter-
mediate input costs in total production of French manufacturing ﬁrms was
about 70% in 2005 while that of labor cost was 20% (SESSI, 2008). The
impact of production changes on prices depends on α, that is the inverse of
the returns to scale. The closer to constant these returns are, the smaller is
the impact of production changes on marginal cost and thus on the product
price.
7Another option is chosen in Dhyne et al. (2007). Because the information they have is
limited to prices, they assume a particular decomposition of the optimal price associated
with the underlying unobserved costs and demand and estimate a state-dependent model
explaining price changes.
14The parameters Ai(j)t cannot be estimated without restrictions. Then, we
decompose them into a ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀect, a sector-speciﬁc eﬀect, and a third
term representing a sectoral time-varying component of prices. Following
Dhyne et al. (2007), we approximate this last unobserved component by the
sectoral Production Price Indices at the NACE2 level (PPIjt).8
The occurrence of a price change depends on the diﬀerence p∗
it − pit−1.
Unfortunately, not only, as shown above, the optimal price p∗
it is not directly
observable but the price level itself, pit−1 is not observable in our data since
only changes are recorded. In order to solve this problem, we assume that
ﬁrms fully adjust to the optimal price level when they adjust their prices,
as usual in state-dependent pricing models. Furthermore, by deﬁnition of a
price spell, the price does not vary along such a price spell. A price change
thus corresponds to a deviation of the optimal price with respect to the price
prevailing at the start of the spell. Consider a spell that started at time t0 :
∆pit = p∗
it − pit−1 = p∗
it − p∗
it0. (12)
From equations (11) and (12), it follows that :
∆pit = δ∆s lnPPIjt+(α−1)∆s lnQit+β∆s lnwit+γ∆s lniipit+uit, (13)
where ∆sx represents the variation of x over the course of the spell. The
desired price change is a function of the cumulative changes in the labor cost,
price of the intermediate inputs, production level and sectoral inﬂation.9
Following Loupias and Sevestre (2010), cumulative changes are decomposed
into their current value, their ﬁrst lag and the remaining variation since
the previous price change. This set-up allows for diﬀerent impacts of the
current and past variations of the variables, occurring for example when
past variations in the costs are discounted the further the shocks occurred
in the past.
This leads to an ordered probit model explaining the occurrence and
magnitude of price changes, very similar to the one in Loupias and Sevestre
(2010). It can be written as:
∆pit = j if αj(k)−1 < ∆p∗




itβp + ∆witγp + u
p
it, (15)
where α−2(k) = −∞, α1(k) = ∞, and where the α0
j(k)s are parameters deﬁn-
ing the price inaction band which depends on the unobserved menu cost,
8The number of time periods and sectors are both large in our data, as T is greater
than 100 and the number of sectors is also quite large. Not using this approximation
would lead to a large loss of degrees of freedom.
9Our price equation also contains a set of yearly dummies aimed at capturing macroe-
conomic shocks.
15possibly speciﬁc to the industry (k) to which the ﬁrm belongs.X
p
it is the
vector of the covariates appearing in equation (13).10
As stated in Section 2.3, the available information regarding variations
of the product price, of the intermediate input prices as well as those of
the ﬁrm production level is qualitative: each inquired variable may take on
seven diﬀerent values, starting from a strong decrease up to a strong increase
through medium or small decreases, the absence of change and small or
medium increases. However, we have redeﬁned these variables so as to consist
of three outcomes: decrease, no change and increase. Indeed, wages and the
producer price indices which also enter this equation are initially provided
as quantitative variables. Then, in order to make all the variables in the
price equation measured in the same way and facilitate the interpretation of
their coeﬃcients, we have considered only 3 outcomes for all these variables:
increases, decreases, and the absence of change in the quarterly averages.
3.4 Econometric speciﬁcation
3.4.1 Wage and price interdependence
We consider two sources of simultaneity in our model. First, we want to
allow for a possible interdependence between the magnitude of wage changes
and their timing. Second, a dependence between the ﬁrm’ price and wage
“decisions” may exist: ﬁrst because the determination of each variable may
explicitly account for the evolution of the other, and second because of unob-
served factors that may aﬀect simultaneously both wage and price changes,
such as changes in the ﬁrm production technology or in its compensation
policy.
We handle the simultaneity problems using both instrumental variables
methods and an explicit modeling of the correlations. We introduce the
correlations in writing the error terms as follows:
ud
it = λdit + σded
it, (16)
uw











it are independent standard gaussian variates, and
λd,λw and λp are factor loadings. The variance matrix of the residuals of



















The variance matrix is a function of six parameters : λd,λw,λp,σd,σw
and σp, while we can only estimate var(uw
it) and three correlations between
10See Appendix B for a detailed description of the variables measurement.
16the residuals.11 Constraints have to be imposed to ensure identiﬁcation, and
we normalize λd,σd and σp to 1.12 Identiﬁcation proceeds as follows: labor




The identiﬁcation of λw and λp follows.
3.5 Likelihood
We present here the likelihood of the model involving all the factor loadings.
When dit = 1, a non-zero growth rate of wages is observed leading to the
joint density:
f(dit,∆wit,∆pit) = f (dit = 0,∆wit = 0,∆pit ∈]αj−1,αj])
1−dit
× f (dit = 1,∆wit = ∆w∗
it,∆pit ∈]αj−1,αj])
dit . (20)



































itβp − ∆witγp − λp)
− Φ(αj−1 − X
p
itβp − ∆witγp − λp)
δijtφ()d, (21)
where δijt is a dummy variable indicating a price change of magnitude j.
The ﬁrst and second blocks are identical to the likelihood of a type 2 Tobit
model, as well as to the likelihood of a simple hurdle model (see for example
Wooldridge, 2001 [pp. 536-538]) where the latent variable is normal. The
third block of equation (21) is the likelihood of an ordered probit model.
From relation (21), σw is identiﬁed because the wage variations are observed
when they occur.
Further endogeneity sources can also be a concern for variables other
than prices and wages. Indeed, variables determined at the micro level may
share some common shocks, or be subject to measurement errors. We as-
sume the potentially endogenous explanatory variables to be the outcome of
11We can estimate var(u
w
it) from the observed ∆wit. As regards d
∗
it, only its sign is
known and the variance cannot be recovered, as for a standard probit model. The variable
∆pit is qualitative and the variance of its latent counterpart cannot be obtained from the
observables, unless the thresholds are known.
12Notice that there is no need to normalize σp when the thresholds are known in relation
(14).
17a linear model with a standard gaussian error. One can thus write likelihood
(21) as the product of a likelihood conditional on the endogenous variables
and their marginal likelihood, leading to a consistent instrumental variable
two-step procedure. The estimates displayed in the remaining of the paper
are obtained using two-step approaches, and the likelihood (21) needs to be
maximized in the second step. It involves only one integral, due to the speci-
ﬁcation of common factors. This can be approximated using Gauss-Hermite
quadrature, and we use 20 evaluation points in the application. Estima-
tion is implemented in GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004), which runs
in Stata (StataCorp, 2005). Our procedure leads to a GMM type estimator.
We approximate the asymptotic variance matrix of the resulting estimates
using paired bootstrap with 500 replicated samples.
4 Econometric results
4.1 Wage equations
Several sets of estimates of our equations have been obtained, which rely
on diﬀerent sets of assumptions regarding mainly the endogeneity of the
regressors in the model. A ﬁrst set of estimates relies on the assumption that
the duration of wage spells is endogenous, as explained below. This induces
that all the other ﬁrm-level covariates that may be considered as decision
variables for the ﬁrm (e.g. the expected and current output price changes)
are also endogenous. The estimates of Model 2 are obtained assuming that
the duration of wage spells is exogenous, whereas the variables related to the
output price are still considered as endogenous. The last two sets of estimates
we provide correspond to a model from which insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients in the
previous regressions are removed. The estimates of Model 3 are obtained
without specifying the correlation between the price and wage equations to
be generated by factor loading. The last pair of columns contains estimates
of a model where the endogeneity of wages (resp. of prices) in the price (resp.
wage) equation is captured through factor loadings as described above.
Table 3 provides the estimates of the equation explaining the occurrence
of wage changes, while the corresponding marginal eﬀects are reported in
Appendix C. First of all, based on the ﬁrst two sets of estimates, a sim-
ple likelihood ratio test of the assumption of exogeneity of the wage spell
duration cannot be rejected (LR(7) = 6.2 < 14.07).
A related conclusion that emerges from these estimates is that the oc-
currence of wage changes is strongly time-dependent. The timing of wage
changes seems to obey a “pre-determined” calendar rather than being a con-
sequence of the ﬁrm’s decision to proceed to wage changes given the evolution
of its environment. In accordance with the stylized facts reported e.g. in
Druant et al. (2009), changes tend to cluster in the ﬁrst quarter of the year.
We also control for the time elapsed since the last wage change. The prob-
18ability of a labor cost variation ﬁrst decreases as time goes by,13 but the
hazard exhibits a clear spike at one year: there exist a strong tendency of
wages to vary yearly, even though we observe infra-yearly variations. An
explanation might be that single wage agreements can be implemented in
two successive wage increases (cf Heckel et al., 2008).
The impact of state-dependent factors such as the acceleration of inﬂa-
tion, the occurrence of a large productivity shock or a change in the ﬁrm
output price are either insigniﬁcant or of a quite limited magnitude. One
must keep in mind however that, for a very large majority of ﬁrms, price
and productivity variations are of a quite small magnitude. It is thus not
really surprising that these changes do not induce changes in the timing of
wage changes. However, our estimation results point to a modest increase
in the likelihood of a wage change when the CPI inﬂation accelerates. It
is also worth mentioning that the full instrumental variables estimates are
quite close to those obtained with the factor model. This may be seen as an
indication of the robustness of these estimates. Finally, as expected, smaller
ﬁrms are less likely than large ones to be subject to a change of their average
wage cost due to a change in their workforce.
13As emphasized in Fougère et al. (2007), such a decreasing hazard should not be mis-
interpreted. It is likely to result from the pooling of heterogeneous constant hazards.
19Table 3: Estimated coeﬃcients of the decision equation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat
Time dependent factors
Elapsed duration:
1 quarter 0.33 0.27 0.43 5.96 0.42 6.45 0.42 7.21
2 quarters 0.33 0.32 0.40 5.70 0.40 6.07 0.40 6.68
3 quarters 0.14 0.19 0.20 2.65 0.20 2.91 0.20 3.16
4 quarters 0.82 1.55 0.86 10.57 0.86 10.81 0.86 11.94
Seasonal dummies :
1st quarter 0.59 8.64 0.60 16.66 0.60 17.33 0.60 20.09
2nd quarter 0.29 3.13 0.29 9.97 0.29 9.77 0.29 9.51
3rd quarter 0.29 3.10 0.29 7.45 0.29 7.72 0.29 8.07
State dependent factors
Expected change in producer price 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.57 - - - -
Change in producer price 0.03 0.79 0.03 1.12 - - - -
Change in producer price (-1) 0.02 0.23 0.02 0.56 - - - -
Change in CPI inﬂation 0.05 0.93 0.05 2.97 0.05 2.67 0.05 2.68
Persistent shock on productivity 0.04 0.39 0.04 1.18 - - - -
Control variables
Firm size: < 149 -0.21 -0.69 -0.20 -4.06 -0.20 -4.06 -0.20 -6.25
Firm size: 150-499 -0.08 -0.30 -0.07 -1.55 -0.08 -1.68 -0.08 -2.57
Constant -0.47 -0.44 -0.56 -6.37 -0.53 -6.84 -0.53 -7.64
Other
Log-likelihood -38 393.6 -38 396.7 -38 402.5 -38 428.0
Treatment of the endogeneity of :
- ∆wit FL FL FL FL
- ∆pit IV IV IV FL
- remaining variables IV IV IV IV
Wage spell duration Endog. Exog. Exog. Exog.
Micro variables Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont.
Instrumental variables Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont.
Bootstrap Yes Yes Yes No
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 15 635 15 635 15 635 15 635
Notes:
- the list of instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem includes the lagged
values over the four preceding quarters of the inﬂation, unemployment and PPI growth
rate, lagged values over the three preceding quarters of the productivity, price of the raw
materials and production, along with seasonal indicators, year and industry dummies.
- "continuous" stands for the quarterly average of monthly variations.
- Treatment of the endogeneity : "IV" stands for instrumental variables; "FL"
for factor loadings.
4.1.1 Magnitude of wage growth
Table 4 provides the estimates of equation (8), the mean wage growth rate
variations whenever it diﬀers from 0, while the marginal eﬀects are reported
20in Appendix C. As could be expected, we get a positive impact of the CPI
inﬂation on the nominal wage growth rate. One must be careful in interpret-
ing the coeﬃcients we obtain. The last coeﬃcient relates to the impact of
the CPI growth rate from the start of the wage spell through t−2. However,
given that the average duration of wage spells is less than 2 quarters (it
equals 1.92 quarters), the degree of indexation, for the average wage spell, is
equal to 0.15 + 0.56 + 0.27 = 0.98. Our estimates also point to the expected
negative impact of unemployment and its’ lagged value on wage growth. A
possible interpretation is that both the level of unemployment and its change
over the current period tend to exert a negative pressure on wage increases.
21Table 4: Estimated coeﬃcients of the mean wage growth equation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat
Macro variables
Expected CPI inﬂation 0.27 2.41 0.25 3.37 0.27 3.71 0.26 3.56
CPI inﬂation 0.17 1.84 0.17 2.38 0.15 2.33 0.16 2.85
CPI inﬂation (-1) 0.77 2.87 0.56 10.35 0.56 10.24 0.56 10.93
Remaining CPI inﬂation 0.68 0.87 0.49 10.35 0.50 10.26 0.50 12.81
Unemployment -1.04 -4.67 -1.11 -5.67 -1.13 -5.95 -1.19 -6.13
Unemployment (-1) 0.52 1.58 0.58 2.09 0.58 3.69 0.62 3.68
Unemployment (-2) 0.02 0.07 -0.03 -0.18 - - - -
Micro variables
Expected producer price change -0.22 -0.31 -0.69 -1.35 - - - -
Producer price change 1.03 1.18 0.98 2.03 0.42 2.30 0.10 2.62
Producer price change (-1) -0.83 -0.86 0.02 0.46 - - - -
Remaining producer price changes 0.66 0.80 -0.02 -0.30 - - - -
Productivity change 0.22 1.84 0.21 2.07 0.25 2.61 0.23 2.47
Productivity changes (-1) 0.12 2.17 0.11 2.25 0.10 1.97 0.11 2.43
Remaining productivity changes -0.07 -0.63 0.01 0.33 - - - -
Control variables
Firm size: < 149 0.11 1.15 0.17 3.16 0.13 2.66 0.15 2.95
Firm size: 150-499 0.06 1.13 0.09 2.02 0.07 1.76 0.07 1.67
Constant 5.50 2.97 6.22 4.63 6.16 4.77 6.32 5.38
Other
Std. dev. of u
w
it 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.36
Log-likelihood -38 393.6 -38 396.7 -38 402.5 -38 428.0
Treatment of the endogeneity of :
- dit FL FL FL FL
- ∆pit IV IV IV FL
- remaining variables IV IV IV IV
Wage spell duration Endog. Exog. Exog. Exog.
Micro variables Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont.
Instrumental variables Cont. Cont. Cont. Cont.
Bootstrap Yes Yes Yes No
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 15 635 15 635 15 635 15 635
Note: the list of instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem includes the lagged
values over the four preceding quarters of the inﬂation, unemployment and PPI growth
rate, lagged values over the three preceding quarters of the productivity, price of the raw
materials and production, along with seasonal indicators, year and industry dummies.
An interesting aspect of our results is that ﬁrms are more likely to in-
crease wages when they increase their own output price in the same quarter.
In accordance with the theoretical framework we use, this can be seen as
the evidence of some rent sharing between the ﬁrm and the workers. More-
over, changes in the ﬁrm’s productivity also have a signiﬁcant impact on
the magnitude of the ﬁrm’s wage evolution. Given the qualitative nature of
the variables available to compute our measure of the evolution of the pro-
ductivity (see Appendix B), it is unfortunately not possible to compare the
estimates we obtain here with previous estimates of the impact of produc-
22tivity on wages (e.g. see Biscourp et al., 2005, Guiso et al., 2005, and, more
recently, Katay, 2008, and Cardoso and Portela, 2009). It remains however
that this impact is signiﬁcantly positive. Finally, the average wage increases
seem to be larger in smaller ﬁrms than what they are in large ones. A pos-
sible explanation of this result lies in the composition of the workforce in
these two categories of ﬁrms: smaller ﬁrms tend to employ, on average, more
unskilled workers, i.e. more workers who are paid at the minimum wage.
Then, this result may be explained by the quite signiﬁcant increases of the
minimum wage over the period we consider.14
In order to further assess the relevance of our estimates, we have com-
puted the expected instantaneous wage growth, conditional on the occur-
rence of a change in wages. The average expected growth rate is of 1.09%,
as predicted by Model 3. The mean of dit is of 0.54, leading to increases of
the mean nominal wage of 2.36% per year. These results are in line with the
raw statistics reported by the Ministry of Labour and Social Aﬀairs (DARES,
2009), that indicate a growth of 2.34% of the mean nominal individual wage
per year for the manufacturing industry over the time period of our study.
4.2 Price equation
Table 5 provides the estimated coeﬃcients of the price equation.15 The
ﬁrst set of estimates is obtained using a standard Probit speciﬁcation where
no account is made for the endogeneity of regressors, in particular of wages.
Estimates referred to as Model 3 and Model 4 do take this issue into account.
14The minimum wage was increased by about 5.5% in 2003, 2004 and 2005. These
increases are signiﬁcantly larger than those of the other wages.
15The estimated marginal eﬀects are provided in Appendix C.
23Table 5: Estimated coeﬃcients of the price equation, micro variables in increases
or decreases except wage changes
Model Ord. Probit Model 3 Model 4
Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat
Explanatory variables
Wage change 0.02 2.94 0.20 2.36 0.02 2.21
Wage change (-1) 0.00 0.13 0.04 1.35 -0.01 -1.08
Remaining cumul. wage change 0.00 0.83 0.05 1.31 -0.00 -0.26
Interm. input price change 0.45 28.09 0.57 2.82 0.73 4.68
Interm. input price change (-1) 0.02 0.77 0.32 2.61 0.22 2.39
Rem. cum. interm. input price change 0.00 0.06 0.51 6.05 0.47 8.54
PPI change 0.11 10.57 0.10 8.55 0.10 8.89
PPI change (-1) 0.03 1.97 0.17 4.44 0.16 5.70
Remaining cumul. PPI change -0.00 -0.36 0.29 5.49 0.29 8.17
Production change 0.09 8.48 0.18 3.12 0.26 6.57
Production change (-1) 0.02 1.39 0.13 4.56 0.13 5.99
Remaining cumul. prod. change 0.01 1.19 0.13 3.15 0.14 5.61
Cut points
α1 -1.16 -31.02 -0.73 -6.19 -0.91 -20.46
α2 0.84 22.81 1.30 10.94 1.13 25.24
Other
Log-likelihood -13 088.6 -38 402.5 -38 408.5
Treatment of the endogeneity of :
- ∆wit No IV FL
- dit No IV FL
- remaining variables No IV IV
Micro variables Incr. - decr. Incr. - decr. Incr. - decr.
Instrumental variables No Cont. Cont.
Bootstrap No Yes No
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes
Year indicators Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 15 635 15 635 15 635
Note: the list of instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem includes the lagged
values over the four preceding quarters of CPI inﬂation, unemployment, PPI growth rate,
productivity, price of the raw materials and production, along with seasonal indicators,
year and industry dummies.
The results we obtain are very similar to those presented in Loupias and
Sevestre (2010). The main driver of price variations is the cost of interme-
diate inputs, contemporaneous and lagged. These eﬀects dominate those of
the other variables. This results is not really a surprise given that the in-
termediate input represent the largest component in the production cost at
the ﬁrm level. The share of intermediate input costs in total production of
French manufacturing ﬁrms was about 70% in 2005 (SESSI, 2008). Moreover,
the magnitude of these shocks, as measured by price changes of intermedi-
ate products, is generally larger than that of wage changes. According to
estimates of Model 3, the inﬂuence of wage variations comes second in mag-
24nitude. This limited impact of wage changes on price changes is essentially
a consequence of their limited share in total production costs (about 20% in
2005, SESSI, 2008). It may also be explained by the possibility for ﬁrms to
ﬁnd other ways to adjust to wage increases than raising their prices. Indeed,
ﬁrms may use other margins of adjustment such as productivity increases. It
is worthwhile mentioning that these wage changes are clearly endogenous to
price variations. Indeed, comparing the estimates of a simple ordered Probit
model with those obtained using instrumental variables (Model 3), we see
that accounting for the endogeneity of wages signiﬁcantly increases the esti-
mated response of prices to wage changes, as expected from the theoretical
model. However, as shown by the estimates of Model 4, using a common
factor approach for controlling the endogeneity of wages does not seem to
work properly. The factor loading speciﬁcation may here be too restrictive.
Variations of the sectoral price index, both current and lagged, also ap-
pear to impact prices in a signiﬁcant way, though to a lower extent. These
variations can be seen to account for common shocks within the industry, so
that, subsequently, ﬁrm speciﬁc regressors account for the only idiosyncratic
shocks (on intermediate input prices, wages or demand). These results may
be considered to indicate that idiosyncratic shocks on intermediate input
costs in particular have a stronger inﬂuence on prices than common shocks
(see Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009, who explain why this may be the
case).
Finally, variations in the level of the ﬁrm production also have a signif-
icant impact on their price decisions. This result diﬀers from the ﬁndings
in Altissimo et al., (2006) and Loupias and Sevestre (2010) who ﬁnd that
the impact of production changes on prices is smaller than that of changes
in their costs. A possible explanation might be that the averaging of the
monthly variations we initially observe reduces the transitory component of
these changes. The variable in our study then essentially accounts for per-
sistent variations in the production level. Such “persistent” variations are
indeed more likely to induce price changes than transitory ones.
The robustness of these results have been assessed by considering al-
ternative speciﬁcations of our model. First, we have considered alternative
deﬁnitions of the dependent variable, regressors and instruments. The re-
sults we obtain lead to very similar conclusions than the estimates presented
and discussed above (see Appendix D.1): the timing of wage changes ap-
pears to be essentially determined on a calendar basis and the evolution of
the ﬁrm environment does not seem to impact strongly the occurrence of
wage changes. The magnitude of wage changes as well as the occurrence and
magnitude of price changes are much more state-dependent. The magni-
tude of wage changes depends on CPI inﬂation, both observed over the past
and expected for the period to come. The situation on the labor market
as measured by the unemployment ratio and its variation also aﬀect wages
signiﬁcantly. Finally, these estimates also conﬁrm the possible existence of
25some rent-sharing mechanisms between ﬁrms and their workers as both the
evolution of the ﬁrms output price and of their productivity appear to have
an impact of the magnitude of wage changes. As regards price changes, the
importance of intermediate input price variations is conﬁrmed together with
the smaller impact of wage and output changes on the ﬁrms price change
decisions.
We have also explored more thoroughly the possible impact of productiv-
ity shocks on the occurrence of wage changes by using alternative deﬁnitions
of these shocks such as the occurrence of two consecutive signiﬁcantly neg-
ative variations in the ﬁrm productivity, the magnitude of such negative
variations, the absolute value of the recent evolution of the ﬁrm productiv-
ity, etc. However, none of them led to signiﬁcant results so that the results
are not reported here. We also included in the model additional regressors
to check whether accounting for speciﬁc features might be relevant and/or
alter our main conclusions. The results, provided in Appendix D.2 show
that ﬁrms having experienced during two consecutive quarters a decrease in
their employment level tend to freeze their wages. Moreover, as expected,
ﬁrms with a signiﬁcant fraction of workers paid at the minimum wage are
more likely to proceed to wage increases during the third quarter. As a
consequence, the average wage increases are larger during the third quarter
when ﬁrms employ a signiﬁcant fraction of low wage workers. This is clearly
a consequence of the quite signiﬁcant increases in the minimum wage that
occurred in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Indeed, the minimum wage (SMIC) was
increased by about 5.5% in July of these three years; these increases being
signiﬁcantly larger than those of wages higher than the minimum wage.
5 Conclusion
Our paper empirically investigates the linkage between wage and producer
price changes at the ﬁrm level. We explicitly allow for correlations between
the occurrence of changes in the mean wage, their magnitude and price
changes. In order to tackle the endogeneity of both the price and wage
changes in two equations of our model, we consider two alternative treat-
ments: we use instrumental variables in a two-step procedure, and we also
specify a model with a factor loading that allows to model explicitly the
correlation between prices and wages.
Our results point toward time dependence in the scheduling of wage
adjustments and towards state dependence in their magnitude as well as in
price changes. The wage variations can be essentially described as driven by
a Phillips’ curve. Firms’ prices are sensitive to an increase in wages, but this
eﬀect is less important than that of the cost of intermediate inputs, which
dominates in the manufacturing industry. Prices clearly depend on wages,
which appear to be endogenous in the price equation. Though the timing of
26wage changes does not appear to depend on that of the ﬁrm’s price changes,
their magnitude seems to be aﬀected by that of price changes. However, this
eﬀect is limited and much less important than that of CPI inﬂation.
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29A Derivation of the likelihood
We distinguish whether ∆wit is zero or not. When dit = 0, ∆wit is necessarily
null and the observed wages do not convey further information. The couple
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where ∆witγp = 0. When dit = 1, the wage bill evolution is observed and




Pr(∆pit ∈]αj−1,αj]|∆wit,dit = 1,)
g(∆wit,dit = 1|)φ()d. (23)
When the labor cost growth rate is non-zero, dit is equal to 1 and we can
rewrite the ﬁrst component of equation (23):
Pr(∆pit ∈]αj−1,αj]|∆wit,dit = 1,) = Pr(∆pit ∈]αj−1,αj]|∆wit,). (24)
The density function corresponding to the second component of equation
(23) is:
g(∆wit = ∆w∗
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30B Variables deﬁnition and measurement.
Except for wages, all ﬁrm-level variables in our models (i.e. changes in
the ﬁrm’s output price, in the intermediate input prices, in the production
level, in the productivity, in employment) come from the Banque de France
business survey. The data collected in this survey are qualitative and may
take 7 values ranging from -3 (strong decrease) to +3 (strong increase). To
make their periodicity consistent with that of the data about wages, we have
computed their quarterly averages. Possible values are still in the range -3
to +3 but they are then no more limited to integer values. Moreover, for
robustness checks, we use an alternative deﬁnition of these variables where
we just distinguish between increases and decreases (i.e. these variables take
the value -1 if the quarterly average is negative and take the value 1 if the
quarterly average is positive).
Wage changes are computed as the average of wage changes for each of
the job positions surveyed in the ACEMO survey. Depending on the size
of the establishment, 1 to 12 positions are considered, with a very strong
majority being asked about at least 3 positions. Whenever more than one
job position is inquired, the weights used are given by the relative proportion
of each category inquired in the total employment of the ﬁrm.
B.1 Explanatory variables of the occurrence of wage changes
Time dependent factors
• duration dummies : indicators of the duration elapsed since the last
wage change; the reference is given by durations of more than 4 quar-
ters. The proﬁle provides a non parametric estimate of the conditional
hazard function.
• seasonal dummies: equals 1 if the observation corresponds to quarter
j,0 otherwise; the reference is the 4th quarter.
State dependent factors
• Expected change in producer price: quarterly average of the expected
change in the ﬁrm’s output price for the period to come as declared at
time t by the ﬁrm itself;
• Change in producer price in t (resp. in t − 1): quarterly average of
the changes in the ﬁrm’s product price during quarter t (resp. quarter
t − 1);
• Change in inﬂation: diﬀerence between the CPI inﬂation averaged over
quarters t−1 and t−2 and averaged over quarters t−3 and t−4,
so as to capture variations within a year.
31• Persistent shock on productivity: indicator taking the value 1 if the
ﬁrm experienced a decrease of its productivity below the ﬁrst quartile
of productivity changes in the sample at quarters t − 1 and t − 2.
Control variables
• Firm size:< 149: dummy variable for ﬁrms with at most 149 employees
(ref. = ﬁrms with at least 500 employees);
• Firm size: 150-499: dummy variable for ﬁrms with 150 to 499 employ-
ees (ref. = ﬁrms with at least 500 employees)
B.2 Explanatory variables of the magnitude of wage changes
Macro variables
• expected CPI inﬂation: expectations on the CPI inﬂation are not avail-
able and we assume rational expectations, that is we replace the ex-
pected inﬂation over the next 4 quarters by its’ observed value. This
value is subject to measurement errors with respect to the individual
expectations, and the endogeneity induced is tackled with the instru-
mental variables.
• CPI inﬂation in t (resp. in t − 1): CPI inﬂation over quarter t (resp.
t − 1), computed as the change in the monthly CPI between the last
month of the quarter (resp. of the previous quarter) and that observed
3 months before.
• Remaining CPI inﬂation: sum of the quarterly CPI inﬂation from the
start of the wage spell through t − 2; 0 if the spell lasts less than 3
quarters.
• Unemployment ratio in t (resp. in t − 1 and t − 2): quarterly average
of the aggregate unemployment ratio at quarter t (resp. in t − 1 and
t − 2).
Micro variables
• Expected change in producer price: quarterly average of the expected
change in the ﬁrm’s output price for the period to come as declared at
time t by the ﬁrm itself;
• Change in producer price in t (resp. in t − 1): quarterly average of
the changes in the ﬁrm’s product price during quarter t (resp. quarter
t − 1);
32• Remaining producer price changes: sum of the quarterly averages of
the changes in the ﬁrm’s product price from the start of the wage spell
through t − 2;
• Productivity changes in t (resp. in t−1): diﬀerence between the quar-
terly average of the ﬁrm’s production variation between t − 1 and t
(resp. t − 1 and t − 2) and that of its employment over the same pe-
riod;
Control variables
• Firm size:< 149: dummy variable for ﬁrms with at most 149 employees
(ref. = ﬁrms with at least 500 employees);
• Firm size: 150-499: dummy variable for ﬁrms with 150 to 499 employ-
ees (ref. = ﬁrms with at least 500 employees)
B.3 Explanatory variables of price changes
• Wage change in t (resp. in t − 1): average wage change in the ﬁrm
during quarter t (resp. quarter t − 1).
• .Remaining cumul. wage change: sum of the quarterly averages of the
changes in the ﬁrm’s wage from the start of the price spell through
t − 2.
• Interm. input price change in t (resp. in t − 1): average change in the
ﬁrm’s intermediate inputs prices during quarter t (resp. quarter t−1)
• Remaining cumul. interm. input price change: sum of the average
changes in the ﬁrm’s intermediate inputs prices from the start of the
price spell through t − 2.
• PPI change in t (resp. in t−1): PPI inﬂation at the NACE-2digit level
over quarter t (resp. t−1), computed as the change in the monthly PPI
between the last month of the quarter (resp. of the previous quarter)
and that observed 3 months before.
• Remaining PPI inﬂation: sum of the quarterly PPI inﬂation from the
start of the wage spell through t − 2; 0 if the spell lasts less than 3
quarters.
• Production change in t (resp. in t − 1): average production change in
the ﬁrm during quarter t (resp. quarter t − 1).
• Remaining cumul. prod change: sum of the quarterly averages of
the changes in the ﬁrm’s production from the start of the price spell
through t − 2..
33C Estimated marginal eﬀects
Table C1: Marginal eﬀects of the wage equations
Variable dit ∆wit|dit = 1
Ma. Eﬀ. Z-stat Ma. Eﬀ. Z-stat
Macro variables
Expected CPI inﬂation 0.27 3.60
CPI inﬂation 0.15 2.76
CPI inﬂation (-1) 0.56 11.01
Remaining CPI inﬂation 0.50 12.78
Unemployment -1.13 -5.86
Unemployment (-1) 0.58 3.46
Micro variables
Producer price change 0.42 2.28
Productivity change 0.24 2.94
Productivity change (-1) 0.10 2.22
Time dependent factors
Elapsed duration:
1 quarter 0.42 7.22 0.10 4.30
2 quarters 0.40 6.68 0.09 4.23
3 quarters 0.20 3.16 0.05 2.76
4 quarters 0.86 11.94 0.17 4.93
Seasonal dummies :
1st quarter 0.60 20.07 0.13 5.12
2nd quarter 0.29 9.50 0.07 4.61
3rd quarter 0.29 8.04 0.07 4.43
State dependent factors
Change in CPI inﬂation 0.05 2.68 0.01 2.42
Control variables
Firm size: < 149 -0.20 -6.22 0.08 1.66
Firm size: 150-499 -0.08 -2.57 0.05 1.16
Table C2: Marginal eﬀects of the price equation, in percent
∆p < 0 ∆p = 0 ∆p > 0
Ma. Eﬀ. Z-stat Ma. Eﬀ. Z-stat Ma. Eﬀ. Z-stat
Wage change -4,34 -2.98 -0,81 -2.83 5,15 2.99
Wage change (-1) -0,87 -1.67 -0,16 -1.64 1,03 1.67
Remaining cumul. wage change -0,98 -1.81 -0,18 -1.78 1,16 1.81
Interm. input price change -12,51 -3.51 -2,33 -3.27 14,85 3.51
Interm. input price change (-1) -6,89 -3.26 -1,29 -3.06 8,18 3.26
Rem. cum. interm. input price change -11,20 -8.95 -2,09 -6.34 13,29 8.96
PPI change -2,09 -8.67 -0,39 -6.24 2,48 8.68
PPI change (-1) -3,67 -5.95 -0,68 -4.95 4,35 5.95
Remaining cumul. PPI change -6,34 -8.19 -1,18 -6.04 7,52 8.19
Production change -3,93 -3.67 -0,73 -3.40 4,66 3.67
Production change (-1) -2,90 -5.92 -0,54 -4.94 3,44 5.92
Remaining cumul. prod. change -2,72 -5.13 -0,51 -4.45 3,23 5.13
34D Robustness checks
D.1 Alternatives deﬁnitions of micro variables
Table D1 : Estimated coeﬃcients of the decision equation, micro
variables in increases or decreases
Model 5 Model 6
Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat
Time dependent factors
Elapsed duration:
1 quarter 0.42 6.04 0.42 6.08
2 quarters 0.40 5.73 0.40 5.77
3 quarters 0.20 2.68 0.20 2.69
4 quarters 0.86 10.64 0.86 10.65
Seasonal dummies :
1st quarter 0.60 17.16 0.60 17.11
2nd quarter 0.29 9.92 0.29 9.85
3rd quarter 0.29 7.49 0.29 7.44
State dependent factors
Expected change in producer price - - - -
Change in producer price - - - -
Change in producer price (-1) - - - -
Change of inﬂation 0.05 2.97 0.05 2.96
Persistent shock on productivity - - - -
Control variables
Firm size: < 149 -0.20 -4.05 -0.20 -4.10
Firm size: 150-499 -0.08 -1.58 -0.08 -1.59
Constant -0.53 -6.28 -0.53 -6.30
Other
Log-likelihood -25 526.6 -25 523.7
Speciﬁed wage-price correlation No No
Micro variables Incr. - decr. Incr. - decr.
Instrumental variables Continuous Incr. - decr.
Wage spell duration Exogenous Exogenous
Bootstrap Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes
Year indicators Yes Yes
Number of observations 15 635 15 685
Note: the list of instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem
includes the lagged values over the four preceding quarters of the
inﬂation, unemployment and PPI growth rate, lagged values over the
three preceding quarters of the productivity, price of the raw
materials and production, along with seasonal indicators,
year and industry dummies.
35Table D2 : Estimated coeﬃcients of the mean wage growth equation,
micro variables in increases or decreases
Model 5 Model 6
Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat
Macro variables
Expected CPI inﬂation 0.27 3.62 0.26 3.55
CPI inﬂation 0.15 2.37 0.14 2.08
CPI inﬂation (-1) 0.56 10.28 0.55 10.23
Remaining CPI inﬂation 0.50 10.67 0.50 10.70
Unemployment -1.12 -5.65 -1.08 -5.60
Unemployment (-1) 0.59 3.54 0.55 3.34
Unemployment (-2) - - - -
Micro variables
Expected producer price change - - - -
Producer price change 0.38 2.45 0.33 2.42
Producer price change (-1) - - - -
Remaining producer price changes - - - -
Productivity change 0.19 1.92 0.28 3.10
Productivity changes (-1) 0.07 1.63 0.11 2.11
Remaining productivity changes - - - -
Control variables
Firm size: < 149 0.13 2.75 0.13 2.74
Firm size: 150-499 0.07 1.74 0.06 1.64
Constant 5.90 4.48 5.97 4.55
Other
Std. dev. of uw
it 1.47 1.47
Log-likelihood -25 526.6 -25 523.7
Speciﬁed wage-price correlation No No
Micro variables Incr. - decr. Incr. - decr.
Instrumental variables Continuous Incr. - decr.
Wage spell duration Exogenous Exogenous
Bootstrap Yes Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes
Year indicators Yes Yes
Number of observations 15 635 15 685
Note: the list of instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem
includes the lagged values over the four preceding quarters of the
inﬂation, unemployment and PPI growth rate, lagged values over the
three preceding quarters of the productivity, price of the raw
materials and production, along with seasonal indicators, year and
industry dummies.
36Table D3 : Estimated coeﬃcients of the price equation, continuous micro variables
Model Model 5 Model 6
Coef. Z-stat Coef. Z-stat
Explanatory variables
Wage change 0.02 2.34 0.15 2.07
Wage change (-1) 0.01 1.06 0.04 1.76
Remaining cumul. wage change 0.01 1.38 0.05 1.70
Interm. input price change 0.56 30.45 0.79 3.91
Interm. input price change (-1) 0.01 0.47 0.22 1.79
Remaining cumul. interm. input price change -0.02 -1.03 0.45 5.26
PPI change 0.16 16.48 0.12 8.80
PPI change (-1) -0.02 -1.24 0.08 2.18
Remaining cumul. PPI change -0.01 -1.35 0.08 1.35
Production change 0.09 8.81 0.08 1.55
Production change (-1) 0.03 1.94 0.10 3.88
Remaining cumul. prod. change 0.01 0.96 0.11 3.61
Other
Log-likelihood -19 850.9 -19 658.1
Speciﬁed wage-price correlation No No
Price variable Average Average
Micro variables Continuous Continuous
Instrumental variables No Continuous
Bootstrap No Yes
Industry indicators Yes Yes
Year indicators Yes Yes
Number of observations 15 635 15 685
Note: the list of instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem
includes the lagged values over the four preceding quarters
of the inﬂation, unemployment, PPI growth rate, productivity,
price of the raw materials and production, along with seasonal
indicators, year and industry dummies.
37D.2 Accounting for changes in the minimum wage and for
persistent shocks on employment
Table D4 : Estimates of the decision equation controlling






1 quarter 0.40 5.76
2 quarters 0.39 5.43
3 quarters 0.19 2.48
4 quarters 0.84 10.00
Seasonal dummies :
1st quarter 0.71 10.94
2nd quarter 0.32 6.14
3rd quarter 0.07 1.25
Low wage workers speciﬁc
seasonal dummies :
1st quarter -0.36 -6.55
2nd quarter -0.26 -5.18
3rd quarter 0.09 1.61
4th quarter -0.20 -3.57
State dependent factors
Expected change in producer price - -
Change in producer price - -
Change in producer price (-1) - -
Change in inﬂation 0.05 3.20
Persistent shock on productivity - -
Persistent decrease in employment -0.08 -3.13
Control variables
Firm size: < 149 -0.18 -3.76









Number of observations 15 685
38Table D5 : Estimates of the mean wage growth equation
controlling for shocks on employment and for the




Expected CPI inﬂation 0.30 3.89
CPI inﬂation 0.28 3.97
CPI inﬂation (-1) 0.58 10.43
Remaining CPI inﬂation 0.48 9.77
Unemployment -1.23 -6.62
Unemployment (-1) 0.69 4.10
Unemployment (-2) - -
Micro variables
Expected producer price change - -
Producer price change 0.36 2.06
Producer price change (-1) - -
Remaining producer price changes - -
Productivity change 0.19 1.92
Productivity change (-1) 0.10 2.09
Remaining productivity changes - -
Control variables
Firm size: < 149 0.16 3.12
Firm size: 150-499 0.08 2.00
Impact of the proportion
of low wage workers at :
1st quarter -0.47 -5.24
2nd quarter -0.16 -1.77
3rd quarter 0.30 3.10
4th quarter -0.11 -1.01
Constant 6.11 4.59
Other








Number of observations 15 685
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